| Abstract | Odgovornost za štetu u suvremenoj se pravnoj teoriji određuje kao obvezni odnos u kojemu je jedna strana dužna popraviti uzrokovanu štetu drugoj strani, a druga je strana ovlaštena zahtijevati takav popravak. Postoje različiti pravnoteorijski kriteriji po kojima se razvrstava odgovornost za štetu. Ta odgovornost može postojati kao izvanugovorna, predugovorna i ugovorna odgovornost, zatim subjektivna-kulpozna i objektivna-kauzalna odgovornost, te vlastita odgovornost i odgovornost za drugoga. Subjektivnu-kulpoznu i objektivnu-kauzalnu odgovornost za štetu uobičajeno je u pravnoj teoriji i sudskoj praksi razmatrati kao alternativne temelje odgovornosti, dvije odvojene, međusobno isključive vrste odgovornosti. Pravila objektivne odgovornosti primjenjuju se na štete od opasne stvari i djelatnosti što je propisano ZOO, te na štete u drugim slučajevima propisanim zakonom. Koje su to stvari i djelatnosti opasne, ZOO nije definirao, već je to pitanje prepustio sudskoj praksi i pravnoj teoriji. Za neke opasne stvari i djelatnosti, zakonodavac nije kvalifikaciju opasnosti prepustio sudskoj praksi, već je objektivna odgovornost njihovih imatelja, odnosno vršitelja propisana ZOO i drugim zakonima. Sudska je praksa određene stvari izdvojila kao opasne iz različitih razloga-neke su opasne već same po sebi, odnosno po svojoj prirodi, samo njihovo postojanje izvor je opasnosti, neke su to s obzirom na određene karakteristike i nedostatke koje imaju, neke s obzirom na svoj položaj, a neke s obzirom na uporabu i pogon itd. Opasnu djelatnost mogu predstavljati sve one čovjekove aktivnosti kojima se stvara povećana opasnost štete za okolinu, bez obzira da li konkretna opasnost potječe od neke opasne stvari ili je djelatnost opasna sama po sebi bez neke povezanosti s opasnom stvari. Kada se govori o širem polja primjene spomenuti će se šteta prouzročena neispravnim stanjem nekretnine, odgovornost za štetu koju prouzroče životinje, odgovornost za neispravan proizvod, odgovornost za štetu prouzročenu motornim vozilom, te odgovornost za štetu prouzročenu opasnim supstancama ili imisijama. Za naše je pravo specifična vrlo široka mogućnost primjene pravila o objektivnoj odgovornosti za štete prouzročene opasnom stvari i opasnom djelatnošću, jer iste zakonodavac nije definirao. Ipak, moramo uočiti da ono ostavlja i mogućnost preširoke primjene pravila o objektivnoj odgovornosti za štetu, budući da bi ona, ipak, trebala biti izuzetak, a odgovornost na temelju presumirane krivnje pravilo. Usporedba s poredbenim pravom pokazuje da se za stvari i djelatnosti od kojih potječe pojačana opasnost, a nije posebno propisana objektivna odgovornost, odgovara postroženo, ali još uvijek na temelju krivnje. I bez primjene objektivne odgovornosti za štetu, odgovornost, dakle može biti dovoljno stroga. Ima li praktične potrebe zadržati tako “širom otvorena vrata” mogućoj primjeni objektivne odgovornosti za štetu? Usporedba s poredbenim pravom i onim što se smatra najbližim mogućem zajedničkom odštetnom sustavu europskih zemalja, čini se da ukazuje na negativan odgovor. |
| Abstract (english) | In modern legal theory, liability for damages is classified as a mandatory obligation of one party to compensate for damages caused to another party in a legally binding relationship. Other party (claimant) is authorized to demand such compensation. Liability for damages is classified under diverse legal criteria. Such liability may exist as a non-contractual, pre-contractual and contractual responsibility, as a subjective or objectively-causal culpability and further, as a form of responsibility to self and the other. Subjective or objectively-causal liability for damages are in legal theory and judicial practice viewed as alternatives - two separate, mutually exclusive forms of responsibility. The regulations concerning objective liability are applied to damages caused by dangerous things or activities, as proscribed by COA (Civil Obligations Act), and to damages in other cases proscribed by law. COA did not proscribe what things or activities are considered dangerous and has left such interpretations to judicial practice and legal theory. For some dangerous things and activities, the legislator did not left the qualification to common judicial practice but has proscribed, by COA and other laws, the objective liability of their owners or doers. Judicial practice has classified certain things as dangerous for various reasons - some are considered harmful in and of itself (by nature, the very existence of such things is considered harmful), some are dangerous regarding the characteristics or flaws they possess, other considered dangerous regarding the position, usage, principles of operation etc. Dangerous activities may be represented as those activities of man which when conducted present a highly significant risk of harm, even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors. In such activities harm may come as a result of usage of dangerous things, or the activity itself may be harmful without the involvement of dangerous things. Referring to the broader field of application one may also mention damages resulting from usage of defective products, incorrectly built properties, damages produced by animals, motor vehicles or dangerous substance emissions etc. Croatian judicial practice is specific in a way because the legislator has not defined specific objective responsibility regulations for damages caused by dangerous things and activities so there exist a very broad possibility of applications and interpretations. On the other hand, this presents the opportunity for a too broad usage of objective responsibility regulations when they should in fact be the exception and a responsibility based on the presumed guilt the actual rule. Correlation to comparative law shows that for things and activities which produce heightened risk of harm and for which the legislator has not proscribed specific objective responsibility regulations, there are harsher sanctions, but sentences are still passed based on guilt. Therefore, even without the application of objective responsibility regulations, punishments can be strict enough. To conclude, is there a practical need to keep such "doors wide open" to possible objective responsibility regulations for damages? Comparison with comparative law and what is considered closest to a common reimbursement system between European countries seems to show otherwise. |
